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DISCOVERABILITY OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR SURVEILLANCE IN SOUTH
CAROLINA: NAVIGATING THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE UNDER SAMPLES
V. MITCHELL 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario: A plaintiff sues a defendant claiming back
and arm injuries related to a car accident. In preparing the defendant's case for
trial, the defendant's attorney hires a private investigator to investigate the
plaintiff and to conduct surveillance assessing the extent of her injuries.
Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the private investigator records video surveillance
of the plaintiff lifting heavy objects, doing yard work, and hanging clothes-all
of which are inconsistent with her alleged debilitating injuries. During pretrial
discovery, plaintiffs counsel requests the production of any surveillance
conducted of the plaintiff. The defendant's attorney knows this surveillance is
his strongest impeachment tool and would likely help the defendant prevail at
trial. The question of whether a defendant can protect the contents of
surveillance from discovery by claiming it as privileged work product has not
been clearly answered in South Carolina.
This Note provides an analysis of the scope of the work product doctrine,
emphasizing the discoverability of private investigator surveillance in South
Carolina. Part II of this Note explains the development of the work product
doctrine in federal courts, focusing on its origin and its scope. Part III discusses
the development of the doctrine in South Carolina and how it affects discovery
practice. Part IV analyzes the discoverability of private investigator surveillance
by exploring case law from South Carolina and from other jurisdictions that have
addressed the issue. Part V provides possible solutions to the hypothetical facts
above and concludes that a South Carolina court would likely find such
surveillance to be work product but ultimately discoverable. Finally, Part VI
briefly concludes by discussing the balance struck by a proposed equitable
solution. While private investigator surveillance may be considered work
product under the rules of civil procedure, the best way to balance the interests
of all parties is to give the defendant an opportunity to depose the plaintiff before
requiring full disclosure of the video surveillance. This balance encourages
truthful litigation and allows for a more efficient system, while still upholding
the policies of the discovery rules of promoting free and open discovery so as to
prevent surprise at trial.
1. 329 S.C. 105, 495 S.E.2d 213 (Ct. App. 1997).
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II. THE RISE OF THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE
A. Background
"It is not without reason that various safeguards have been established to
preclude unwarranted excursions into the privacy of a man's work.",2 One such
safeguard is the work product doctrine, which courts have developed to protect
the adversarial nature of our judicial system and the role of the advocate that the
attorney plays in our system.3 The doctrine helps to ensure effective client
service and further upholds the cause of justice.4 Through this doctrine, the legal
system protects an attorney's confidential work product and therefore preserves
the important role of attorneys as advocates. Such protection encourages
6thorough preparation, truthful litigation, and judicial efficiency, all of which are
foundational to our system.
7
Prior to the advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules),
an attorney did not need a protective doctrine8 because "[t]he discovery devices
at [common] law were narrowly defined and of limited use, and the primary
equitable discovery device, the bill of discovery, did not permit disclosure of an
adversary's case."9 The work product doctrine has its origins in the attorney-
client privilege, which evolved in England as a mechanism to "protect[]
communication between attorney and client." 10 As English courts embraced
2. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 497 (1947).
3. See id at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[A] common law trial is and always should be
an adversary proceeding. Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform
its functions either without wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary."); Duplan Corp. v.
Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1974) ("It seems clear from the
whole tenor of the Hickman opinion that the court was concerned with protecting the thought
processes of lawyers and thus the very adversary system.").
4. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511 ("Were such [work product] materials open to opposing
counsel on mere demand, ... [t]he effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the
interests of the clients and the cause ofjustice would be poorly served.").
5. Id. at 510-11 ("[i]t is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free
from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.").
6. Jeff A. Anderson et al., Special Project, The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L.
REv. 760, 786 (1983) ("The zone of privacy also removes serious disincentives to thorough
preparation.... Absence of a work product doctrine would encourage laziness and a 'wait and see'
attitude." (citing Developments in the Law Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REv. 940, 1029 (1961))).
7. See Duplan Corp., 509 F.2d at 736 ("It is true that litigation is no longer a game of hide
and seek, and also true that justice is to a large extent equated with truth. But if attorneys may not
freely and privately express and record mental impressions, opinions, conclusions, and legal
theories, in writing, and clients may not freely seek them, then there is justice for no one .... ); see
also FED. R. CIv. P. 1 ("[These rules] should be construed and administered to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.").
8. Anderson et al., supra note 6, at 765 ("Because his client's case was largely immune
from discovery in American courts prior to the Federal Rules, an attorney had no need for a
protective doctrine either at law or in equity.").
9. Id. (footnote omitted).
10. Id. at 766.
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liberal discovery procedures in the late 1800s, they expanded the privilege to
materials prepared for trial. 1 This privilege, combined with the adoption of the
Federal Rules, evolved into the work product doctrine in United States courts.
12
B. Adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1937 significantly
altered the existing approach to civil litigation by placing an emphasis upon
pretrial discovery. Rather than using the pleadings process to develop issues
14and facts, the Federal Rules promote such development through discovery.
However, the initial Federal Rules did not provide a clear mechanism to protect
material that would be considered privileged today. 15 That lack of protection
often caused inconsistent courtroom results regarding compelled disclosure of
trial preparation materials. 16 While there was inconsistency regarding disclosure
of preparation materials, the change emphasized by the Federal Rules was
typically manifested by compelled production of trial preparation materials.
17
Because of the inconsistent results and the lack of clarity regarding the level of
protection given to trial preparation materials, the Civil Advisory Committee
suggested several amendments to the applicable Federal Rules to clarify the
protection granted.1 8 However, the proposed amendments were not adopted
because the United States Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Hickman v.
11. See id. ("During the last half of the nineteenth century, when liberal discovery procedures
were developing in England, the courts expanded professional privilege to include not only
communications between attorney and client, but also materials prepared for trial .... ").
12. See id. ("The adoption in 1937 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure initiated a slow
revolution in attitude toward pretrial discovery that led to the development of a work product
doctrine in the United States." (footnote omitted)).
13. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1947) ("The pre-trial deposition-
discovery mechanism established by Rules 26 to 37 is one of the most significant innovations of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.... Thus civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried
on in the dark.").
14. See Anderson et al., supra note 6, at 767.
15. See id. ("As complete as th[e] discovery scheme was, however, it did not include a
mechanism for resolving conflicts similar to those addressed by the attorney-client privilege in
evidentiary matters.").
16. Id. at 768 ("With no clear directive in the Rules, the district courts rendered inconsistent
results, deciding the cases under one of three general positions: (1) the Rules require production of
trial preparation materials; (2) the Rules prohibit production of trial preparation materials; or (3) the
Rules should be strictly interpreted to limit production of trial preparation materials even though the
Rules do not absolutely prohibit their discovery." (footnote omitted)).
17. See id. ("The cases requiring production of trial preparation materials are the most
consistent with the spirit of radical change that the Rules sought to engender." (footnote omitted)).
18. See generally id. at 771-72 (discussing the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure from 1944 to 1946).
2010]
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Taylor 9 and "chose to articulate the standard of protection for work product in
its ... decision.,
20
C. Hickman v. Taylor
In Hickman, a tugboat sank while crossing the Delaware River, killing five
crew members. 21 The tug owners and underwriters employed a law firm to
investigate and defend them against lawsuits brought by the deceased's estates.22
Fortenbaugh, a member of the law firm employed by the tug owners and
underwriters, privately interviewed survivors, taking statements and notes in
preparation for the anticipated litigation.23 During pretrial discovery, counsel for
the victims' families sent interrogatories to Fortenbaugh's firm, one of which
asked whether any statements of the crew members were taken and requested
that defense counsel "[a]ttach .. .exact copies of all such statements if in
writing, and if oral, [that counsel] set forth in detail the exact provisions of any
such oral statements or reports." 24 Fortenbaugh declined to answer the
interrogatory, claiming that "answering the[] requests 'would involve practically
turning over not only the complete files, but also the telephone records and,
almost, the thoughts of counsel.' ' 25 The district court held that the requested
material was not privileged and ordered Fortenbaugh to provide the requested
26 27material. When he refused, the court held Fortenbaugh in contempt of court.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district
court's judgment and "held that the information.., sought was part of the 'work
product of the lawyer' and hence privileged from discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure." 28 The court concluded that, although the requested
materials were not protected under the attorney-client privilege, "the policies
supporting the attorney-client privilege, which were intended to encourage full
disclosure by the client, required that the privilege protect work product from
discovery."
2
The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit.30 Recognizing the inadequate
procedures under the pleadings-based regime, the Court emphasized the
19. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
20. Anderson et al., supra note 6, at 773.
21. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 498.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 498-99 (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Id. at 499.
26. Id. at 499-500 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479, 482 (E.D. Pa. 1945)).
27. Id. at 500.
28. Id. (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 222-23 (3d Cir. 1945)).
29. Anderson et al., supra note 6, at 775 (citing Hickman, 153 F.2d at 222-23).
30. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 514.
[VOL. 61 : 691
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importance of discovery under the Federal Rules. 31 The Court stated, "[C]ivil
trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark. The way is
now clear, consistent with recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain the
fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial. 32 While the Court
recognized a broad application of the discovery rules, it also recognized
necessary limits that such rules must have if they are to govern trial procedure
effectively. 33 The Court articulated these limits, stating that "[n]ot even the most
liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and
the mental impressions of an attorney."34 From a practical perspective based on
the nature of the work of a lawyer,35 "it is essential that a lawyer work with a
certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties
and their counsel.", 6
D. The Meaning of Hickman
In Hickman, the Court recognized that the role of an attorney is necessarily
adversarial and therefore that this role must be given some form of protection to
allow the attorney to best represent a client and protect the client's interests.
37
Without such work product protection, the effectiveness of an attorney and the
cause ofjustice would be jeopardized.38 However, there may be circumstances in
which an attorney's work product could in fact be discoverable.39
31. Id. at 507 ("We agree, of course, that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a
broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to
preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case.").
32. Id. at 501 (citing James A. Pike, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure and
the Rules of Evidence, 34 ILL. L. REv. 1, 1 (1939); James A. Pike & John W. Willis, The New
Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure: I, 38 COLUM. L. REv. 1179, 1186 (1938); James A. Pike
& John W. Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure: II, 38 COLuM. L. REv. 1436,
1440 (1938)).





37. See id. ("Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work for the
advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients. In performing
his various duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free
from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.").
38. Id. at 511 ("Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the
giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession
would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly
served.").
39. See id. ("We do not mean to say that all written materials obtained or prepared by an
adversary's counsel with an eye toward litigation are necessarily free from discovery in all cases.
Where relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where production of
those facts is essential to the preparation of one's case, discovery may properly be had."); see, e.g.,
Ward v. CSX Transp., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 38, 40 (E.D.N.C. 1995) ("Surveillance materials are clearly
within the definition of work product .... The surveillance materials are, however, entitled to only
2010]
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One commentary has described the Hickman decision as a "milestone in the
history of the Federal Rules. 40 While it was a monumental decision in the
development of much-needed protection,4 1 it provided little guidance to lower
courts. V2 Because of the unanswered questions, in 1953 and 1970, the Civil
Advisory Committee proposed changes to the discovery rules "to clarify the
effect of Hickman.'' 3 In fact, the 1970 amendments added Rule 26(b)(3), which
codified the Hickman holding, to the Federal Rules.44 While the proposed
amendments took significant strides toward making the work product doctrine
more understandable, the doctrine is often still the subject of litigation.4 5
III. DISCOVERY IN SOUTH CAROLINA
A. Rules
The applicable rules governing discovery in South Carolina are substantially
similar to those in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 46 The South Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure (South Carolina Rules) provide for discovery of "any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action."47 As in the Federal Rules, 48 the work product doctrine is
codified in Rule 26(b)(3) of the South Carolina Rules, and the Rule states that
parties may obtain discovery of documents and tangible items otherwise
discoverable that are "prepared in anticipation of litigation ...only upon a
showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in
a qualified immunity .... The qualified immunity can be overcome by a showing of substantial
need.").
40. Anderson et al., supra note 6, at 780.
41. See id. ("As a political decision, it helped the Rules gain further acceptance. As a
declaration of principles, it decisively undercut attempts to narrowly construe the scope of
discovery." (citing Edward H. Cooper, Work Product of the Rulesmakers, 53 MiNN. L. REV. 1269,
1273 (1969))).
42. Id. ("[A]s an attempt to finally resolve the problem of the scope of work product
immunity, [Hickman] proved to be a source of much confusion, offering little specific guidance to
the district courts." (citing Comment, Attorney's Work Product Rule-An Area of Confusion, 31
FORDHAM L. REV. 530 (1963); John S. Holbrook, Jr., Comment, The Work Product Doctrine in the
State Courts, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1199 (1964))); see also Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de
Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 733 (4th Cir. 1974) ("In the federal courts from 1946 to 1970, the scope of
Hickman and the work product doctrine was left to adjudication on a case by case basis. The
decisions were often conflicting, and .. .[Hickman] opened a Pandora's Box." (citing Viront v.
Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 10 F.R.D. 45, 47 (N.D. Ohio 1950))).
43. Anderson et al., supra note 6, at 782-84.
44. Id. at 783.
45. Id. at 762-63.
46. See S.C. R. CIV. P. 26 notes (noting that most of the language used in Rule 26 of the
South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure is the similar to or the same as the language used in Rule
26 of the Federal Rules).
47. S.C. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
48. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
[VOL. 61 : 691
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the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain
the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. 49
The work product doctrine constitutes a qualified immunity for work
prepared in anticipation of litigation that a party may overcome if it makes an
adequate showing under the South Carolina Rules. 50 To determine whether work
product at issue qualifies for protection as being prepared in anticipation of
litigation, South Carolina courts look to whether the work product at issue was
"prepared because of the prospect of litigation., 51 However, no South Carolina
case has addressed the scope of the "substantial need," "undue hardship," or
"substantial equivalent" language of Rule 26(b)(3). Indeed, other "[c]ourts have
not taken a uniform approach in applying" this language under the Federal
Rules.52 For instance, in interpreting Rule 26(b)(3), some courts use a three-
prong test, while other courts use a two-prong test.53 The factual application of
each test will be similar regardless of which test is used.
Courts following a three-prong analysis first consider whether there is a
"substantial need" for the work product. 4 A showing of substantial need requires
more than mere relevancy under Rule 26(b)(1), 55 and if the matter at issue does
not contain information that is essential to an element of a party's case, then the
56inquiry ends. Second, a court looks at "whether substantially equivalent
information can be obtained from another source. 57 If substantially equivalent
information cannot be obtained, then a party has satisfied the "substantial need"
prong.58 Lastly, a court asks whether requiring a party to obtain the substantially
equivalent information would create "an undue hardship. 59 The "undue
hardship" created must be more than "mere[] expense or inconvenience, '60 and
the party must have at least attempted to obtain any substantial equivalent that is
available.61
49. S.C. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see also Tobaccoville USA, Inc. v. McMaster, No. 26799, 2010
WL 1439108, at *3 (S.C. Apr. 12, 2010) ("The attorney work product doctrine protects from
discovery documents prepared in anticipation of litigation, unless a substantial need can be shown
by the requesting party.").
50. JAMES F. FLANAGAN, SOUTH CAROLINA CIVlI PROCEDURE 219 (2d ed. 1996).
51. Tobaccoville USA, 2010 WL 1439108, at *3.
52. Fletcher v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 194 F.R.D. 666, 670 (S.D. Cal. 2000).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 671. For a general discussion of the three-prong test, see Anderson et al., supra note
6, at 801-03.
55. See Fletcher, 194 F.R.D. at 671.
56. Id. (citing 6 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.70[5][c] (3d ed.
1999)).
57. Id.
58. See id. In Fletcher, the court noted that mere "[c]onclusory allegations do not establish
that no substantially equivalent source of information exists." Id. at 674.
59. Id. at 671.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 675.
2010]
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The two-prong test is governed by a similar factual analysis, but it condenses
the second and third elements of the three-prong test into one inquiry. Courts that
use the two-prong test require a showing of "substantial need" and "undue
hardship." 62 The substantial need inquiry asks "whether the information is an
essential element" to the party's claim or defense and whether the party "can
obtain the [information] from an alternate source. 63 In addition, "[t]he undue
hardship prong examines the burden [that] obtaining the information from an
alternate source would impose on the party requesting discovery. 64 While no
South Carolina court has directly followed the aforementioned tests or
established a separate test, the fact-based inquiry would be similar, given that the
same rules govern civil litigation in South Carolina.65
The South Carolina Rules also provide for a protective order, which allows
for the exclusion of certain items from discovery. A court may make any such
order that "justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance,
67embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden by expense." If the court finds
that justice requires protecting something from discovery, the court may issue an
order that the item may not be discovered or that it may be discovered only on
68specified terms. In addition, "[t]he rules of civil procedure allow the trial judge
broad latitude in limiting the scope of discovery when the discovery process
threatens to become abusive."
69
In South Carolina, courts have recognized the work product doctrine.7 °
While there is little case law on the doctrine in South Carolina, one trial court
held that the work product doctrine prevented discovery of investigative reports
in the possession of an expert witness prepared by an insurance adjuster in a
medical malpractice suit.71 This case demonstrates that South Carolina
recognizes the work product doctrine developed in Hickman, and the state's
62. Id. at 670-71 (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Id. at 671.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g, FLANAGAN, supra note 50, at 219 ("[T]here is no hardship [to obtain the
substantial equivalent] if the requested information can be obtained another way. . . .Likewise,
information in the exclusive control of one party or unique materials like accident photos may
satisfy the rule.").
66. S.C. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Gattison v. S.C. State Coll., 318 S.C. 148, 150, 456 S.E.2d 414, 415 (Ct. App. 1995)
(citing Hamm v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comn'n, 312 S.C. 238, 439 S.E.2d 852 (1994)).
70. FLANAGAN, supra note 50, at 218 (citing S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Booker, 260 S.C.
245, 195 S.E.2d 615 (1973) (per curiam)); see also Tobaccoville USA, Inc. v. McMaster, No.
26799, 2010 WL 1439108, at *3 (S.C. Apr. 12, 2010) (recognizing the work product doctrine but
declining to apply it).
71. Johnston v. Ward, 288 S.C. 603, 608-09, 344 S.E.2d 166, 169 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)), overruled on other grounds by Spahn v. Town of Port
Royal, 330 S.C. 168, 171-73, 499 S.E.2d 205, 206-08 (1998). The South Carolina Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the trial court but did not address the issue of work product on appeal. Id.
at 610, 344 S.E.2d at 170.
[VOL. 61 : 691
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adoption of the language codifying that doctrine in the Federal Rules further
substantiates that proposition.
B. Court Interpretation
The South Carolina judicial system's "scope of discovery is very broad and
'an objection on relevance grounds is likely to limit only the most excessive
discovery request.' 72 Indeed, "[t]he entire thrust of the discovery rules involves
full and fair disclosure, 'to prevent a trial from becoming a guessing game or one
of surprise for either party."' 73 Because discovery provides the means for an
attorney to prepare for trial, any denial of discovery rights results in a
presumption of prejudice. 74 It is the burden of a party who failed to comply with
a discovery request to show a lack of prejudice to overcome this presumption.75
Given the broad interpretation of relevance, the most practical way to attempt to
avoid disclosing an item through discovery in South Carolina is not by claiming
it as irrelevant under Rule 26(b)(1) but by claiming it as work product. However,
even though an item at issue may be deemed work product, it may nonetheless
be discoverable.7 6
IV. DISCOVERABILITY OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR SURVEILLANCE
A. Background
In personal injury litigation, parties usually disagree over the extent of a
plaintiff's injuries.77 A defendant will often conduct surveillance of an allegedly
injured plaintiff to shed light on this issue and to gain an advantage in
litigation. 78 If such surveillance captures a plaintiff exhibiting behavior contrary
to the claimed injury, the video would have significant impeachment value and
could be disastrous for the plaintiff's case.79 For this reason, "both parties have a
72. Samples v. Mitchell, 329 S.C. 105, 110, 495 S.E.2d 213, 215 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing
FLANAGAN, supra note 50, at 216).
73. Id. at 113, 495 S.E.2d at 217 (quoting Booker, 260 S.C. at 252, 195 S.E.2d at 619).
74. Id. at 113-14, 495 S.E.2d at 217 (citing Downey v. Dixon, 294 S.C. 42, 46, 362 S.E.2d
317, 319 (Ct. App. 1987)).
75. Id. at 114, 495 S.E.2d at 217 (citing Downey, 294 S.C. at 46, 362 S.E.2d at 319).
76. See FLANAGAN, supra note 50, at 219 ("The work product is a qualified immunity and
when applied to materials obtained through the efforts of counsel may be overcome ....").
77. See George A. LaMarca, Overintrusive Surveillance of Plaintiffs in Personal Injury
Cases, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 1, 1 (1985).
78. See Kenneth E. Siemens, Comment, The Discoverability of Personal Injury Surveillance
and Missouri's Work Product Doctrine, 57 Mo. L. REv. 871, 871 (1992) ("If the defendant doubts
the severity of the plaintiffs injuries, it is common practice for the defendant to hire private
investigators to conduct surveillance of the plaintiff.").
79. Donna Denham & Richard Bales, The Discoverability of Surveillance Videotapes Under
the Federal Rules, 52 BAYLOR L. REv. 753, 766 (2000).
2010]
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substantial interest in the discoverability of the" surveillance video80 and will
often disagree about its discoverability. No South Carolina court has ruled
directly on whether such surveillance could be protected from discovery as work
product or whether a defendant would have to disclose the contents of a video
prior to trial.81 While private investigator surveillance could be considered work
product and therefore protected from discovery, a plaintiff can likely make a
sufficient showing of "substantial need" for the materials and "undue hardship"
in preparing the plaintiffs case without them 2 such that a South Carolina court
may still require disclosure. However, in balancing the interests of all parties, a
South Carolina court should allow a defendant to protect the contents of
surveillance from discovery at least until the defendant has been given the
opportunity to depose the plaintiff.
The discoverability of surveillance is a controversial issue. Plaintiffs argue
that failing to disclose surveillance video is deceptive and that a court failing to
compel the video's discovery deprives them of their ability to fully prepare a
case. 83 On the other hand, defendants argue that not disclosing surveillance
footage allows them to impeach the plaintiff and to discredit the integrity of the
underlying claim.84 In addition, defendants argue that a plaintiffs uncertainty as
to whether the plaintiff has been the subject of surveillance may be the best way
to ensure legitimate claims.8 5 The threat of its use in court may ensure truthful
testimony. V
The issue of whether to disclose surveillance videos arises either in pretrial
discovery, when plaintiffs request the surveillance videos, or during trial, when
80. Id.
81. But cf Samples v. Mitchell, 329 S.C. 105, 110-11,495 S.E.2d 213, 216 (Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that the failure to disclose the existence of video surveillance prior to trial was sanctionable
as an inaccurate response to an interrogatory).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 50-65.
83. Siemens, supra note 78, at 872 ("[P]laintiffs argue that 'the camera may be an instrument
of deception.' ... [U]nless they can view the film and investigate the photographer's credentials and
techniques and methods used, they are deprived of the opportunity to develop rebuttal evidence and
to fully prepare their cross-examination." (quoting Snead v. Am. Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 59
F.R.D. 148, 150 (E.D. Pa. 1973))).
84. See id. ("Defendants argue ... that the main purpose of surveillance is to impeach the
plaintiffs credibility and to maintain the plaintiff's honesty concerning injuries." (citing Snead, 59
F.R.D. at 150)).
85. Id. at 873 ("Defendants contend a plaintiffs uncertainty as to the existence and contents
of surveillance 'is the best way to promote truthfulness, and the showing of such films in court [is] a
proper way to penalize a plaintiff who has been dishonest."' (alteration in original) (quoting Snead,
59 F.R.D. at 150)); see also Snead, 59 F.R.D. at 150 ("The possibility that [surveillance video]
exist[s] will often cause the most blatant liar to consider carefully the testimony he plans to give
under oath."); Denham & Bales, supra note 79, at 778-79 ("[D]efendants should not be required to
disclose even the existence of videotape surveillance until after the plaintiff's deposition. When a
defendant has conducted video surveillance prior to the plaintiffs deposition, some advantage
might result.., from informing the plaintiff that surveillance has been conducted. This would give
the plaintiff an incentive to be truthful at deposition.").
86. Denham & Bales, supra note 79, at 778-79.
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defendants attempt to introduce videos as evidence. 87 Defendants argue against
producing the video because it is work product prepared in anticipation of
litigation. 88 Plaintiffs assert that not producing the video would place undue
hardship upon the preparation of their case and that there is no substantial
equivalent available. 89 To rebut that argument, a defendant would note that
because the plaintiff was the person engaged in the activity captured on video,
the plaintiff knows precisely the activity that is the subject of the surveillance
and therefore should be able to prepare adequately for trial.90
B. Discovery of Surveillance in South Carolina
No South Carolina court has ruled directly on the issue of whether the work
product doctrine could protect a surveillance video from discovery. However, in
Samples v. Mitchell,91 the South Carolina Court of Appeals sanctioned an
attorney under Rule 11 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure for
providing an inaccurate response to an interrogatory when she failed to disclose
the existence of a surveillance video.92 The defendant in that case did not claim
work product protection and instead answered the interrogatory and willfully
failed to disclose the existence of the video.93 Even though the attorney did not
assert protection from discovery based on work product, the case seemingly
invited such an argument in the future94 and consequently presented a need for
clarifying the issue.
The court did not rule on the discoverability of the contents of the
surveillance video,95 but it did hold that the existence of a defendant's videotape
surveillance of a plaintiff claiming a personal injury was relevant and
87. Id. at 770. This Note focuses on the pretrial discoverability of evidentiary surveillance
rather than evidence not intended to be offered at trial. The former is more likely to be a point of
contention in litigation. See Fletcher v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 194 F.R.D. 666, 671 (S.D. Cal. 2000)
("Although several courts discuss surveillance, few courts have considered the discoverability of
'nonevidentiary' films.").
88. Denham & Bales, supra note 79, at 770.
89. Id.
90. Id.; see, e.g., Dodson v. Persell, 390 So. 2d 704, 706 (Fla. 1980) ("Respondents . . .
contend that discovery of surveillance films is not necessary to eliminate surprise because the
surveillance fil involves facts more readily known by the plaintiff than the defendant and
consequently there is no surprise.").
91. 329 S.C. 105, 495 S.E.2d 213 (Ct. App. 1997).
92. Id. at 110-11,495 S.E.2dat216.
93. See id. (noting that the attorney never actually claimed work product protection but
instead answered interrogatories and failed to disclose the video even though she clearly thought the
video relevant and "useful in drafting her questions").
94. The court suggested that surveillance could be treated as work product in some situations.
See id. at 111, 495 S.E.2d at 216 ("Some states have discussed whether or not surveillance tapes
which will not be introduced at trial constitute work product. The tape in this case, however, was
admitted into evidence, and Mitchell has never claimed protection under the work product rule."
(citing MOORE, supra note 56, § 26.41 [4][b])).
95. Id. at 111 n.4, 495 S.E.2d at 216 n.4.
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discoverable. 96 Consequently, the failure to disclose the videotape was
equivalent to an inaccurate response to an interrogatory and therefore warranted
a Rule 11 sanction.
97
The situation arose after the defendant, Mitchell, rear-ended the plaintiff,
Samples, and "Mitchell admitted negligence, but contested proximate cause and
damages. Mitchell's private investigator videotaped Samples." The private
investigator supplied defense counsel with video of Samples "removing laundry
from a clothesline, watching a [child's] ball game, and using her left hand to
open a gate," 100 all of which were inconsistent with her alleged injuries.101
Samples sent interrogatories to Mitchell, and Mitchell answered but did not
disclose the surveillance video.10 2 Mitchell then deposed Samples's mother and
"specifically questioned [her] about Samples' ability to hang out clothes, to
attend her children's sporting events, and to use the left side of her body."
10 3
After the deposition, Mitchell's lawyer provided Samples's counsel with a copy
of the surveillance video, 104 which provided videotape evidence contradicting the
deposition testimony.10 5 At trial, Samples offered the mother's deposition into
evidence, and Mitchell offered the videotape. ° 6 The trial judge admitted both
pieces of evidence "but refused to allow the investigator to interpret the
[video]. 1 °7
On appeal, the court recognized that the question of the discoverability of
private investigator surveillance had not been raised in South Carolina but had
been addressed in other jurisdictions.1° Looking to Moore's Federal Practice
and to case law from other jurisdictions, the court held that the failure to disclose
the existence of the video amounted to an inaccurate response to an
interrogatory. 1° 9 In addition, although the defendant did not claim protection
from discovery under the work product doctrine, 110 the court noted, in dicta, that
"the work product rule would not excuse the failure to disclose the existence of
96. See id. at 113, 495 S.E.2d at 217 ("At a minimum, the existence of the tape should have
been disclosed in the original answers to Samples' interrogatories, as the tape obviously related to
Samples' personal injury claim.").
97. Id. at 110-11, 495 S.E.2d at 216.







105. See id. at 111 n.4, 495 S.E.2d at 216 n.4.
106. Id. at 108, 495 S.E.2d at 214.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 110, 495 S.E.2d at 215.
109. Id. at 110, 495 S.E.2d at 215-16 (citing Dodson v. Persell, 390 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1980);
McDougal v. McCammon, 455 S.E.2d 788, 796 n.9 (W. Va. 1995); MOORE, supra note 56,
§ 26.41[4][b]). While Mitchell later disclosed the video before trial, the Rule 11 sanction was based
on his inaccurate response to an interrogatory. See id. at 108-10 & n.3, 495 S.E.2d at 214-16 & n.3.
110. Id. at 111, 495 S.E.2d at 216.
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the video tape here."' 1 However, the court left open the possibility that the work
product doctrine could protect the video's contents, stating that "[i]f Mitchell's
attorney believed Samples had no right to this evidence.., because of the work
product rule, she should have either objected to the interrogatory or disclosed the
existence, but not the content, of the evidence and moved for a protective
order."
1 12
In a footnote, the court noted that Mitchell had argued that "admitting the
video into evidence was necessary to avoid allowing the statements of [the
plaintiffs mother] to go uncontradicted" and that "this promoted discovery's
goal of reaching the truth."'1 13 However, the court refused to address this
argument 14 Drawing an important distinction between the existence of the
video and the video's contents, the court noted that the basis of this argument
was "whether ... the contents of a surveillance video should be protected from
discovery until the witness has been deposed in order to safeguard the
defendant's ability to impeach the witness on cross examination."'1 5 However,
because "Mitchell's attorney failed to disclose the video's existence and move
for a protective order covering its contents . . . , the trial judge was never
afforded an opportunity to rule on th[at] issue.
11 6
The court also referenced a 1996 amendment to the South Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure, which requires "the disclosure of the nature of evidence prior to
any claim of privilege so other parties may assess the applicability of the
privilege or protection." 17 Therefore, even if the contents of the surveillance
were privileged, "the rules never permitted an attorney to deny the existence of
evidence deemed privileged."'1 18 However, because the court did not reach
Mitchell's claim for protection of the video's contents and the comments on
work product were dicta, the opinion does not definitively resolve this issue.
C. Meaning of Samples v. Mitchell
The South Carolina Court of Appeals in Samples made it clear that video
surveillance is relevant to a personal injury claim, but the opinion recognized
that there is at least an argument that such surveillance can be claimed as work
product.119 Because the defendant did not object to the interrogatory and claim
111. Id. (emphasis added).
112. Id. (citing S.C. R. CIV. P. 26(c); S.C. R. Civ. P. 33(a)).
113. Id. at 111 n.4, 495 S.E.2d at 216 n.4.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing Townsend v. City of Dillon, 326 S.C. 244, 247, 486 S.E.2d 95, 97 (1997)).
117. Id. at 111 n.5, 495 S.E.2d at 216 n.5 (citing S.C. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)). Although this rule
was not in effect at the time of trial, the court stated, "[R]eading rules 26, 33 and 11 together as they
were at the time of this trial, this court is convinced the rules never permitted an attorney to deny the
existence of evidence deemed privileged." Id.
118. Id.
119. See supra notes 91-112 and accompanying text.
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work product protection, the court did not rule on the issue. The court
acknowledged the important distinction between a video's existence and its
contents, and it stated that, even if it had found the surveillance to be work
product, a defendant would still have to disclose its existence. 21 Therefore, after
the Samples decision, a defendant attempting to protect a video from discovery
in South Carolina should disclose its existence to the court and to the opposing
party. 122 However, whether its contents are protected remains an unresolved
issue. 123 While the court did note in dicta that "[d]iscovery of [this type of]
evidence is generally permitted,"1 24 the opinion does not fully answer the
question. No South Carolina opinion has addressed the issue since Samples, and
some jurisdictions have interpreted Samples to stand for the complete
discoverability of such surveillance, 125 even though the court's opinion does not
clearly support that proposition.
D. Other Jurisdictions
While there is no clear consensus among courts that have considered
whether surveillance evidence is discoverable, most jurisdictions require the
disclosure of video surveillance at some point prior to trial. 12 Although a
majority of jurisdictions have held that such surveillance is relevant and
discoverable,127 an equitable approach exists that allows for both pretrial
discovery as well as preservation of impeachment. The courts that have
addressed this issue can be grouped into five general categories: (1) those courts
that protect surveillance as work product material; (2) those courts that reject the
work product argument and allow discovery of surveillance material; (3) those
120. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
121. Samples, 329 S.C. at 113, 495 S.E.2d at 217 ("At a minimum, the existence of the tape
should have been disclosed in the original answers to Samples' interrogatories ...."); see also
JUSTIN S. KAHN, SOUTH CAROLINA RULES OF PROCEDURE ANNOTATED 135 (2009) ("If the tape
related to the claim, the party in possession had a duty to at least disclose the existence of it." (citing
Samples, 329 S.C. 105, 495 S.E.2d 213)).
122. However, the opinion is unclear as to when the existence of surveillance must be
disclosed. For an argument that the existence should not be disclosed until after the deposition, see
Denham & Bales, supra note 79, at 778-79.
123. The court suggested using a protective order under Rule 26(c) to disclose the existence of
surveillance while protecting its contents. See Samples, 329 S.C. at 111 n.5, 495 S.E.2d at 216 n.5.
124. Id. at 110, 495 S.E.2d at 215 (quoting MOORE, supra note 56, § 26.41[4][b]) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
125. See, e.g., Roundy v. Staley, 984 P.2d 404, 407-08 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (providing
Samples as an example of a court holding that a party must disclose a videotape to the opposing
party before trial); see also Lagge v. Corsica Co-Op, 677 N.W.2d 569, 574 (S.D. 2004) ("[M]ost
jurisdictions hold both the existence and contents of surveillance tapes to be freely discoverable.").
126. See Ranft v. Lyons, 471 N.W.2d 254, 261 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) ("The majority rule... is
that a party is entitled not only to know before trial whether he or she has been subjected to
photographic or video surveillance but to have pre-trial access to the surveillance materials as
well.").
127. Id.
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courts that find surveillance to be work product but nonetheless require
discovery based on a plaintiffs showing of substantial need and undue hardship;
(4) those courts that allow the defendant to depose the plaintiff before disclosing
the video surveillance whether it is work product or not; and (5) those courts that
allow for protection from discovery when the defendant stipulates to limited use
of such surveillance.
1. Protected from Discovery as Work Product
A minority of jurisdictions have protected surveillance as work product.
28
In Ranft v. Lyons,129 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff was not
entitled to pretrial discovery of whether she had been subjected to post-accident
surveillance. 13 The court held that the work product doctrine protected post-
accident surveillance and therefore it was not discoverable. The court
recognized that "[t]he majority rule... is that a party is entitled not only to know
before trial whether he or she has been subjected to photographic or video
surveillance but to have pre-trial access to the surveillance materials as well.
132
However, the court rejected that majority rule and stated that the decision to
conduct surveillance was itself protected as work product. 33 In the court's
opinion, that "decision not only reflects the lawyer's evaluation of the strengths
or weaknesses of the opponent's case but the lawyer's instructions to the person
... conducting the surveillance also reveals the lawyer's analysis of potentially
fruitful areas of investigation., 134 The court further noted that "[d]isclosure of
the fact of surveillance and a description of the materials recorded would...
impinge on the very core of the work-product doctrine." 135 Because the record
"[did] not indicate that [the plaintiff was] not aware of her physical limitations or
that she [did] not know what she did or did not do since the accident," 136 the
court held that there were insufficient reasons to compel discovery. 37 However,
the court concluded by stating that "[a] s long as [the plaintiff has] an opportunity
to seasonably challenge any surveillance material prior to the defendants' use of
the material at trial, neither the [plaintiff] nor the trial's truth-finding function
will be prejudiced.,
138
128. Siemens, supra note 78, at 901.
129. 471 N.W.2d 254 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
130. Id. at 255.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 261.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 262.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 261.
138. Id. at 262.
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2. Discoverable After Rejecting Work Product Argument
In contrast to the approach adopted in Wisconsin, the Utah Court of Appeals
in Roundy v. Staley139 held that video surveillance is relevant and discoverable
and that it is not protected as attorney work product. 14 The defendant never
disclosed a surveillance video in his answers to the plaintiffs discovery requests
relating to the extent of the injuries that the plaintiff suffered in an automobile
accident. The defendant then presented a physician witness at trial who
testified that, based on the surveillance video, he doubted the truth of the
plaintiffs claimed injuries. 142 Upon learning of the video, the plaintiff requested
that the trial court order the defendant to disclose it, but the trial court denied her
request. 143 The trial court allowed the defendant to present the videotape, which
showed the plaintiff "engaging in activities that she had testified she was unable
to perform," to the jury. 4Upon review, the Utah Court of Appeals noted that
"the 'purpose [of Utah's discovery rules] is to make procedure as simple and
efficient as possible ... and to remove elements of surprise or trickery so the
parties and the court can determine the facts and resolve the issues as directly,
fairly and expeditiously as possible."'' 145 The court also stated the general rule
that most courts require disclosure. 146 To support this general rule, the court cited
the Samples dicta, stating that "[d]iscovery of [this type of] evidence is generally
permitted., 147 The court also discussed the purpose of the discovery rules in
Utah. 141 It found that "the trial court clearly erred in refusing to order [the
defendant] to reveal . . . the surveillance video" and further stated that its
"holding is consistent with the purpose of Utah's discovery rules, facilitating fair
trials with full disclosure of all relevant testimony and evidence., 149 The court
rejected the defendant's argument that the videotape was not discoverable
because it was protected as attorney work product, stating that "[e]vidence
139. 984 P.2d 404 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
140. See id. at 408-09.




145. Id. at 407 (quoting Ellis v. Gilbert, 429 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah 1967)).
146. Id. ("Most courts addressing this issue have held that a party in possession of a
surveillance video tape must disclose it to the opposing party prior to trial."). The court cited a
Missouri Court of Appeals case, explaining in a citation parenthetical that the "majority rule [is] that
although surveillance information is work product, such evidence is not protected if it will be used
by the defendant at trial because [the] 'plaintiff needs an opportunity to examine the material to
guard against mistaken identity, possible exaggeration, distortion, and even fraud by the
defendant."' Id. at 409 (citing State ex rel. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Koehr, No. 62252, 1992 WL
230232, at *3 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1992), rev'd, 853 S.W.2d 925 (Mo. 1993)).
147. Id. at 407 (citing Samples v. Mitchell, 329 S.C. 105, 110, 495 S.E.2d 213, 215 (Ct. App.
1997)).
148. See id. (citing Ellis, 429 P.2d at 40).
149. Id. at 408.
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prepared in anticipation of introduction at trial is clearly discoverable under Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1)."15 ° Based on the purpose of the discovery rules
as articulated by the Utah Court of Appeals, a defendant who refuses to disclose
this type of surveillance undermines the entire purpose of those rules.
151
3. Work Product but Nonetheless Discoverable
The third category finds that surveillance constitutes work product but
requires discovery based on substantial need and undue hardship. In Gutshall v.
New Prime, Inc.,152 a Virginia district court held that surveillance in personal
injury litigation is work product. 53 However, because the court found "that a
plaintiff alleging claims for personal injury has a substantial need for
surveillance evidence in preparing his case for trial, due to the relevance and
importance of such evidence, and the substantial impact it may have at trial," the
court held such surveillance to be nonetheless discoverable.
154
In Gutshall, the plaintiff was operating a tractor-trailer and was rear-ended
by a tractor-trailer owned by the defendant corporation.1 55 The plaintiff served
the defendant with interrogatories asking whether the plaintiff had been subject
to surveillance. 56 At the time the defendant answered the interrogatories, he had
not conducted any surveillance and therefore responded in the negative."' The
defendant then arranged for surveillance to be conducted, and the plaintiff
subsequently noticed such surveillance and notified his attorney, who filed a
motion to compel and a motion to exclude.
158
The court rejected the defendant's first claim that such evidence was
protected from discovery because it was prepared "solely for impeachment."
159
150. Id.
151. Seeid. at 409.
152. 196 F.R.D. 43 (W.D. Va. 2000).
153. Id. at 46.
154. Id.




159. Id. at 44-45.
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The court noted that Rule 26(a) of the Federal Rules 16 did not govern the scope
of discovery at issue and therefore was not applicable.
6 1
The court held that, although the surveillance video was work product
prepared in anticipation of trial, it was still discoverable. 162 The court noted that
"it is impossible to procure the substantial equivalent of such evidence without
undue hardship, as videotape 'fixes information available at a particular time and
a particular place under particular circumstances, and therefore cannot be
duplicated."' 163 Consequently, although the surveillance evidence was work
product, it was nonetheless discoverable.
64
4. Defendants Allowed to Depose Plaintiffs Before Disclosing
Surveillance
Some courts have reached an equitable compromise by allowing defendants
to depose a plaintiff prior to requiring disclosure of surveillance.1 65 In Snead v.
160. The language of Rule 26(a) in the Federal Rules is different from the language of Rule
26(a) in the South Carolina Rules. Compare FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(i) ("[A] party must ... provide to
the other parties... the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual
likely to have discoverable information-along with the subjects of that information-that the
disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for
impeachment .... "), with S.C. R. Civ. P. 26(a) ("The frequency or intent of use of discovery
methods . . . shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative . . . ; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample
opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the discovery is
unreasonably burdensome or expensive .... ).
161. See Gutshall, 196 F.R.D. at 44-45 ("[Federal] Rule 26(a)(3) does not describe the scope
of discovery or exclude impeachment evidence therefrom; it describes the scope of automatic initial
disclosure requirements .... Therefore, [the defendant's] reliance on [that rule] is misplaced."). But
see Denty v. CSX Transp., Inc., 168 F.R.D. 549, 550 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (holding that where a
defendant stipulates that any surveillance evidence used will be offered solely for impeachment,
such evidence is excluded from pretrial discovery).
162. Gutshall, 196 F.R.D. at 46.
163. Id. (quoting Smith v. Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 582, 586 (S.D. Tex.
1996)).
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Tripp v. Severe, No. CIV.A.L-99-1478, 2000 WL 708807, at *1 (D. Md. Feb. 8,
2000) ("[T]he various conflicting interests presented are best reconciled by requiring a defendant to
disclose the existence of the surveillance materials ... and requiring the production of the materials
prior to trial, but permitting defendant to defer production of the materials until after plaintiffs
deposition has been taken. This approach prevents unfair surprise while serving the truth-seeking
interests of the litigation process."); Martino v. Baker, 179 F.R.D. 588, 590 (D. Colo. 1998) ("To
preserve the defendant's right to use the tapes as impeachment evidence, however, plaintiffs
deposition is to be completed before the tapes are produced." (citing Ford v. CSX Transp., Inc., 162
F.R.D. 108, 110 (E.D.N.C. 1995))); Ward v. CSX Transp., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 38, 41 (E.D.N.C. 1995)
("[A]llowing discovery of surveillance materials after the deposition of the plaintiff, but before trial,
best meets the ends of justice and the spirit of the discovery rules to avoid surprise at trial....
Inconsistencies between that deposition and the surveillance materials can be used to impeach the
plaintiff at trial."); Daniels v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 110 F.R.D. 160, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
("Before the disclosure, .... defendant must be afforded the opportunity to take the depositions of
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American Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc.,16 6 a Pennsylvania district court held
that if a defendant wants to use at trial surveillance films of a personal-injury
plaintiff, the defendant must disclose to the plaintiff the existence and contents
of surveillance. 167 However, the court stated, "Any rule to be formulated . . .
must balance the conflicting interests of the plaintiff against the conflicting
interests of the defendant and protect both insofar as it is possible to do so.'
6
Therefore, the court held that before the defendant was required to disclose the
surveillance videos, "the [defendant] must be given an opportunity to depose the
plaintiff.,
169
In that case, a merchant seaman brought an action to recover damages
suffered while on the defendant's ship. The defendant refused to answer
interrogatories regarding the "secret motion pictures taken to reveal the true
nature and extent of [the] plaintiff's injuries."171 The court acknowledged the
arguments on both sides before ultimately holding that such surveillance was
discoverable. 172 It recognized that "most defense lawyers contend that if a
plaintiff knows surveillance films exist, he will tailor what he has to say
accordingly." 173 In response, the court stated, "Defendants contend that
uncertainty as to the existence of surveillance pictures is the best way to promote
truthfulness and the showing of such films in court, a proper way to penalize a
plaintiff who has been dishonest."174 The court observed that "plaintiffs, on the
other hand, argue that unless they can check the integrity of the photographer,
the accuracy of his methods, and review the pictures he has taken, they are
deprived of the proper means to cross-examine or seek rebuttal testimony."
175
Plaintiffs argue that "to prevent possible abuse by defense investigators requires
full disclosure as to the films in advance of trial and an opportunity for them to
be seen." 176 After assessing both sides' arguments, the court noted that the
the plaintiff and any other affected persons, so that the prior recording of their sworn testimony will
avoid any temptation to alter that testimony in light of what the films or tapes show."); Dodson v.
Persell, 390 So. 2d 704, 708 (Fla. 1980) ("[F]airness requires that we allow the use of surveillance
materials to establish any inconsistency in a claim by allowing the surveilling party to depose the
party surveilled after the movies have been taken or evidence acquired but before their contents are
presented for the adversary's pretrial examination."); Fender v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. L00-2840,
2001 WL 34037318, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 28, 2001) ("[B]efore Defendant is required to provide
the surveillance videotapes .... the deposition of the Plaintiff and responses to all interrogatories
and other discovery materials.., will have been provided by Plaintiff to Defendant.").
166. 59 F.R.D. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
167. Id. at 151.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 149.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 150-51.
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surveillance was "highly relevant." 177 Analyzing the language of Rule 26(b)(3),
the court noted that the surveillance videos were "unavailable by other means"
and that the plaintiff had a "substantial need" for the surveillance in preparation
for trial. 17 The court stated the following:
A man may know he cannot bend over without pain and therefore feel
he is telling the truth when he says he never reaches down to touch the
floor. Nonetheless, under some particular circumstances he may have
done so and this may be the very incident which the camera has
recorded.
179
While the court recognized that such surveillance is ultimately discoverable,
the court noted that "[e]very need to provide information must be balanced
against the need to withhold it."18 After balancing the interests of both parties,
the existence and contents were discoverable to the plaintiff.181 However, before
disclosing even the existence of the surveillance, "the defense must be given an
opportunity to depose the plaintiff fully as to his injuries, their effects, and his
present disabilities." 182 Allowing deposition before disclosure preserves the
defendant's ability to impeach,18 while adequately providing the plaintiff with
evidence necessary to prepare his case. 184
5. Excluded from Discovery Where Defendant Stipulates to Limited
Use
Another approach adopted by some courts allows for protection of
surveillance from discovery when a party stipulates to its limited use. In Denty v.
CSX Transportation, Inc., 185 a federal district court in North Carolina denied a
plaintiffs motion to compel surveillance evidence where the defendant
stipulated that the surveillance evidence would be used solely for impeachment
purposes. 186 Thus, the court excluded the surveillance from discovery. 187 In
Denty, the plaintiff was injured while working within the scope of his
177. Id.
178. Id. at 150-51.




183. See id. ("Once [a plaintiffs] testimony is memorialized in deposition, any variation he
may make at trial to conform to the surveillance films can be used to impeach his credibility, and
his knowledge at deposition that the films may exist should have a salutary effect on any tendency
to be expansive.").
184. See id. ("[I]f the plaintiff believes that the films seem to give a false impression, he can
then obtain the necessary data to serve as a basis for cross-examination.").
185. 168 F.R.D. 549 (E.D.N.C. 1996).
186. See id. at 549-50.
187. See id. at 550.
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employment as a trainman and sued his employer. 188 The defendant's argument
in opposition to the motion to compel was that "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a)(3) precludes discovery of surveillance materials because they will be used
solely for impeachment purposes." 189 The court accepted this argument, stating
that Rule 26(a)(3) "clearly excludes from pretrial discovery material which will
be used 'solely for impeachment purposes."' 190 Because the defendant stipulated
that it would use the surveillance for only impeachment purposes, the court held
that the surveillance was not discoverable.1 91 The court further noted that "[t]he
obvious rationale for excluding impeachment materials from discovery is that
their disclosure would substantially impair their impeachment value."
192
Finally, another district court has held that if the defendant stipulates that
any video surveillance conducted will not be admitted as evidence, the plaintiff
is not entitled to pretrial disclosure of the video surveillance because the plaintiff
did not establish a substantial need for it.
93
V. GUIDANCE FOR SOUTH CAROLINA PRACTITIONERS
In assessing the various arguments regarding discovery of surveillance
videos, a court will be sensitive to the established rules of procedure, the policies
behind the rules, and the interests of the parties involved. 94 One court has
recognized that a plaintiffs involvement in a personal injury lawsuit lessens the
plaintiffs expectation of privacy, and a plaintiff should "'expect reasonable
inquiry and investigation"' into a claim.19 Without such investigation into the
legitimacy of plaintiffs' claims, the system would fall short of the efficiency
ideals of Rule 1 of the South Carolina Rules.1 96 Recognizing the social utility
gained from investigation of claims, one court has stated, "'It is in the best
interests of society that valid claims be ascertained and fabricated claims be
exposed. ,, 197 Furthermore, when the activities conducted by the plaintiff are in
188. Id. at 549.
189. Id. at 549-50.
190. Id. at 550 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)).
191. Id. But see Gutshall v. New Prime, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 43, 44-45 (W.D. Va. 2000) ("Rule
26(a)(3) does not describe the scope of discovery or exclude impeachment evidence therefrom; it
describes the scope of automatic initial disclosure requirements.... Therefore, [the defendant's]
reliance on Rule 26(a)(3) [to argue for exclusion of surveillance evidence] is misplaced.").
192. Denty, 168 F.R.D. at 550.
193. Fletcher v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 194 F.R.D. 666, 668, 673-74 (S.D. Cal. 2000).
194. See, e.g., Martino v. Baker, 179 F.R.D. 588, 590 (D. Colo. 1998) ("Any rule formulated
... must balance the conflicting interests of the plaintiff against the conflicting interests of the
defendant and protect both insofar as it is possible to do so." (quoting Ford v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
162 F.R.D. 108, 110 (E.D.N.C. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
195. Furman v. Sheppard, 744 A.2d 583, 586 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (quoting Forster v.
Manchester, 189 A.2d 147, 150 (Pa. 1963)).
196. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 1 ("[The Rules] shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.").
197. Furman, 744 A.2d at 586 (quoting Forster, 189 A.2d at 150).
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public and observed by passers-by, a plaintiff "'has exposed herself to public
observation and therefore is not entitled to the same degree of privacy that she
would enjoy within the confines of her own home."'
198
Advocates for protecting surveillance from discovery emphasize the value of
exposing fraudulent claims at trial and thus encouraging more truthful
litigation. 199 However, the judicial system as a whole may benefit more if such
surveillance is disclosed prior to trial because such evidence may convince a
party not to "dissemble" based on the strength of the evidence against it.
20 0
Given the fact that investigation into a personal injury claim is reasonable and
likely expected, a South Carolina practitioner should consider several issues
when assessing the discoverability of such surveillance.
A. Private Investigator Surveillance Is Work Product
A court in South Carolina would likely consider private investigator
surveillance to be attorney work product and thus protected from discovery. The
work product doctrine applies to work product of attorneys as well as to the work
of an attorney's agent. Because an investigator is an attorney's agent and
produces the surveillance video in anticipation of litigation, such surveillance is
technically work product under the South Carolina Rules. In fact, one South
Carolina commentator states, "Courts typically afford work product protection to
an investigator's statement, surveillance tape or other document because the
investigator is considered to be an agent of the attorney, who in turn is a
representative of the client., 20 2 Because it is work product, it should be entitled
to qualified immunity from discovery and should not be discoverable unless the
party seeking disclosure meets the requirements of Rule 26(b)(3).
20 3
While no South Carolina court has directly answered the question of whether
surveillance can be protected as work product, the case law that does exist
suggests that a defendant faced with this question initially has two choices: (1)
198. Id. (quoting Forster, 189 A.2d at 150).
199. See, e.g., Denham & Bales, supra note 79, at 766, 778-79 (noting that surveillance
videos can be used by defendants to impeach a plaintiffs testimony and thus can discourage a
plaintiff "from feigning or exaggerating injuries").
200. See Runions v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., No. CL97001086, 2000 WL 1186265, at *3 (Va.
Cir. Ct. Feb. 22, 2000) (noting that if contents of surveillance convince a party not to craft
testimony, then "truth, justice, and our system of civil adjudication are better served" than if a party
lied and then was impeached in court).
201. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975) ("[T]he [work product] doctrine is
an intensely practical one, grounded in the realities of litigation in our adversary system.... It is
therefore necessary that the doctrine protect material prepared by agents for the attorney as well as
those prepared by the attorney himself.").
202. Robert L. Reibold, Hidden Dangers of Using Private Investigators, S.C. LAW., July
2005, at 18, 20.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 50-65; see also FLANAGAN, supra note 50, at 219
("The work product is a qualified immunity and when applied to materials obtained through the
efforts of counsel may be overcome .... ).
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object to the interrogatory or (2) disclose the existence of the surveillance and
move for a protective order to preclude discovery of the contents.214 If the
defendant objects to the interrogatory, this would presumably postpone the
analysis that follows below. Under the second option, a defendant must first
clearly claim work product protection and disclose the nature of the evidence
without revealing its contents.20 5
The next step would be a factual analysis under Rule 26(b)(5), where a
plaintiff would challenge the protection asserted based on the limiting language
of 26(b)(3).106 In response, the defendant would argue that the plaintiff does not
satisfy the language of Rule 26(b)(3). This fact-intensive inquiry will differ in
every case. However, based on the policy and purpose of the discovery rules as
well as the case law that has addressed the issue in other jurisdictions, a South
Carolina court would likely find that a plaintiff has sufficient need for the
evidence in preparing its case and that the plaintiff has no substantial equivalent
of the surveillance; therefore, the surveillance would be discoverable. Under
the discovery policies asserted in Hickman208 and reinforced in Samples,20 9 a
South Carolina court would likely find that allowing a plaintiff to prepare a case
and prevent surprise at trial outweighs the defendant's desire to impeach in the
courtroom. Furthermore, given the potential for deception caused by surveillance
204. See Samples v. Mitchell, 329 S.C. 105, 111, 495 S.E.2d 213, 216 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing
S.C. R. CIV. P. 26(c); S.C. R. CIV. P. 33(a)).
205. See id. at 111 & n.5, 495 S.E.2d at 216 & n.5 (citing S.C. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)). While
Rule 26(b)(5) was not in effect when the trial court in Samples handed down its decision, id. at 111
n.5, 495 S.E.2d at 216 n.5, this request for a protective order would be accompanied by the
defendant "claim[ing] [work product protection] expressly and ... describ[ing] the nature of the
documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without
revealing the information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the
applicability of the privilege or protection." S.C. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5).
206. S.C. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5) ("When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable
under [the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure] by claiming that it is privileged or subject to
protection as trial preparation material, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe
the nature of the ... things not produced ... in a manner that ... will enable other parties to assess
the applicability of the privilege or protection.").
207. See Gutshall v. New Prime, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 43, 46 (W.D. Va. 2000) ("[I]t is impossible
to procure the substantial equivalent of such evidence without undue hardship, as videotape 'fixes
information available at a particular time and a particular place under particular circumstances, and
therefore cannot be duplicated."' (quoting Smith v. Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc., 168 F.R.D.
582, 586 (S.D. Tex. 1996))); see also FLANAGAN, supra note 50, at 219 ("[I]nformation in the
exclusive control of one party or unique materials like accident photos may satisfy [Rule
26(b)(3)].").
208. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) ("Mutual knowledge of all the relevant
facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel
the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.").
209. See Samples, 329 S.C. at 113, 495 S.E.2d at 217 ("The entire thrust of the discovery rules
involves full and fair disclosure, 'to prevent a trial from becoming a guessing game or one of
surprise for either party."' (quoting S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Booker, 260 S.C. 245, 252, 195
S.E.2d 615, 619 (1973) (per curiam))).
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evidence, 21 a South Carolina court would likely not give absolute protection tosuch surveillance and would probably require its disclosure.
B. Depose Then Disclose
Having established the discoverability of the existence of surveillance, the
unresolved issue in South Carolina is whether, how, and when a defendant can
protect a video's contents. In balancing the interests of all parties, a South
Carolina court should follow the lead of other jurisdictions that allow protection
of the contents of surveillance video until after the defendant is allowed to
depose the plaintiff.
211
This equitable solution, which requires disclosure of video contents only
after deposing the plaintiff, balances the interests of the parties while upholding
the purpose of the discovery rules. If South Carolina adopted such an approach,
the court would not be forced to choose between truth and fairness. While these
two ideals are not mutually exclusive, the arguments on each side suggest they
could, at times, be at odds. In addition, such a rule would be consistent with the
dicta in Samples.212 If instead the contents were wholly protected from
discovery, the defendant's desire for courtroom impeachment would be given
undue weight over the plaintiffs need for preparation. Allowing deposition
before requiring disclosure preserves the defendant's ability to impeach213 while
still providing the plaintiff an opportunity to prepare her case adequately and
assess the integrity of the video itself. Without pretrial disclosure of the video, a
plaintiff would be required to clarify and explain any inconsistencies at trial
without warning. Furthermore, the plaintiff would be unable to assess the
circumstances surrounding the video's filming, the photoyrapher's credentials,
and other details to ensure the accuracy of the evidence. While the defendant
loses his ability to fully utilize the shock of courtroom impeachment, such
surprise impeachment is inconsistent with the policy and purpose underlying the
210. See Snead v. Am. Export-Jsbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 148, 150 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
("[T]he camera may be an instrument of deception. It can be misused.... Thus, that which purports
to be a means to reach the truth may be distorted, misleading, and false.").
211. A defendant and our system of justice also benefit from waiting to disclose the existence
of video surveillance until after the plaintiff has been deposed. See Denham & Bales, supra note 79,
at 778-79 ("[D]efendants should not be required to disclose even the existence of videotape
surveillance until after the plaintiff's deposition.... This would give the plaintiff an incentive to be
truthful at deposition.").
212. See supra text accompanying note 124.
213. See Snead, 59 F.R.D. at 151 ("Once [the plaintiff's] testimony is memorialized in
deposition, any variation he may make at trial to conform to the surveillance films can be used to
impeach his credibility .... ").
214. See id at 150 ("[T]o prevent possible abuse by defense investigators requires full
disclosure as to the films in advance of trial and an opportunity for them to be seen.").
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rules of discovery anyway2 15 and in fact may hurt the system overall. 216 A
defendant cannot expect a court to endorse an absolute work product protection
that would so contradict the underlying policies of the rules.
C. Excluded Solely as Impeachment
A South Carolina court would also likely reject any argument that a court
should protect surveillance video from discovery based on its use "solely for
impeachment." While defendants in other jurisdictions have made this
argument,217 the South Carolina Rules do not contain the same exception as the
Federal Rules under which such an argument is crafted.218 Because South
Carolina has not adopted that language from the Federal Rules, such an
argument would unlikely hold any water with a court.
In addition, while such an argument could be made in other jurisdictions
whose rules do contain such an exception, some courts have held that Rule
26(a)(3) of the Federal Rules is not even the appropriate rule for this situation
because it does not address the scope of discovery but instead discusses the
scope of automatic disclosure under the Federal Rules.
219
D. Appealability
Discovery issues are reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard; therefore,
the trial court's decision is practically the final one.220 In addition, "[d]iscovery
215. See Ward v. CSX Transp., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 38, 41 (E.D.N.C. 1995) ("[A]llowing
discovery of surveillance materials after the deposition of the plaintiff, but before trial, best meets
the ends ofjustice and the spirit of the discovery rules to avoid surprise at trial.").
216. See Runions v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., No. CL97001086, 2000 WL 1186265, at *3 (Va.
Cir. Ct. Feb. 22, 2000) (noting that if contents of surveillance convince a party not to craft
testimony, then "truth, justice, and our system of civil adjudication are better served than they
would have been if the party had lied, and the lie had been exposed in open court").
217. See, e.g., Gutshall v. New Prime, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 43, 44-45 (W.D. Va. 2000) (rejecting
the defendant's argument that "because Rule 26(a)(3) excludes information that will be used solely
for impeachment purposes, . . . [the defendant] was not required to produce that evidence pursuant
to the document requests").
218. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i) (requiring initial disclosure of certain
information "unless the use would be solely for impeachment"), with S.C. R. CIV. P. 26(a)
(containing no comparable language).
219. See Gutshall, 196 F.R.D. at 44-45; see also Ward, 161 F.R.D. at 39 ("Rule 26(a) is
concerned with automatic disclosure of materials, not the scope of discovery .... While [Rule
26(a)(3)] exempts impeachment materials, [Rule 26(b)] does not."). But see Denty v. CSX Transp.,
Inc., 168 F.R.D. 549, 550 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (protecting video surveillance from compelled disclosure
where defendant stipulates that he will offer surveillance evidence only for impeachment).
220. See Bayle v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 344 S.C. 115, 128, 542 S.E.2d 736, 742 (Ct. App.
2001) ("The rulings of a trial judge in matters involving discovery will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion." (citing Dunn v. Dunn, 298 S.C. 499, 502, 381
S.E.2d 734, 735 (1989); Osborne v. Adams, 338 S.C. 82, 90, 525 S.E.2d 268, 273 (Ct. App. 1999),
rev'd on other grounds, 346 S.C. 4, 550 S.E.2d 319 (2001))).
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orders . . . are interlocutory and are not immediately appealable." 221 For these
reasons, a defendant arguing against disclosure must do so aggressively at the
trial level because any ruling will likely not be overturned on appeal, and once
the contents of the video are revealed, a defendant cannot unring the bell. When
the plaintiff sees the contents of a video, any value of impeachment disintegrates
with that viewing. The value is in the contradiction itself, and if that is destroyed,
so is the value of the evidence. However, adequate preparation and a calculated
plan will ensure that no defense attorney is forced into the position of the
attorney in Hickman, allowing oneself to be placed in contempt of court for the
sole purpose of effectuating an immediate appeal.
VI. CONCLUSION
The work product doctrine is an irreplaceable asset to the role of a litigating
attorney, but it rightly has its limits. The qualified immunity of the work product
doctrine is a way to enforce the purposes and policies of the discovery rules so as
to prevent trial by ambush. The question of discoverability of surveillance in
civil litigation is a perfect example of the doctrine striking a balance between the
interests of the parties, the rules of civil procedure, and the policies behind those
rules. While such surveillance is technically deemed work product, the majority
of courts hold that it does not survive the scrutiny in the limiting language of
Rule 26(b)(3) and is therefore ultimately discoverable. This Note provides a
cross-sectional analysis of the issue in South Carolina and highlights the gaps
and ambiguities in one aspect of South Carolina discovery practice. The rules of
discovery and the work product doctrine should strike a balance between
advocacy for a client and contest between adversaries in working towards the
common goal of justice. The equitable solution proposed in this Note-and
adopted by other jurisdictions-allows attorneys to work together as "officer[s]
of the court" to further the goals of service and justice.
222
Bradford J. Gower
221. Hamm v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 312 S.C. 238, 241, 439 S.E.2d 852, 853 (1994)
(citing Exparte Whetstone, 289 S.C. 580, 580, 347 S.E.2d 881, 881 (1986)).
222. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947).
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